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Defining Fashion 
INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF THE  
DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the 2006 Academy Awards Show, actress Felicity 
Huffman wore a black gown created by twenty-seven-year-old 
fashion designer Zac Posen.1 Earlier that year, her television 
show co-star, Marcia Cross, wore a $3,800 coral dress by 
emerging designer Marc Bouwer to the Golden Globe Awards.2 
Within weeks of the two award shows, copies of both dresses 
were being sold in department stores, at a fraction of their 
original prices, by manufacturers that specialize in creating 
“knockoffs” of designer dresses worn by celebrities on the red 
carpet.3 While these manufacturers flourish,4 the emerging 
designers behind the original gowns are operating their 
businesses at a loss.5 Although it may seem unfair that retail 
companies exploit the design investment of struggling young 
designers by copying their works, the practice is entirely legal 
today.6 
  
 1 Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong. 3, 12 (2006) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of Jeffrey Banks, fashion designer); Ruth La Ferla, Night of a 
Thousand Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at G11.  
 2 Anne Bratskeir, The Foldinspiring Dresses: Pathway to the Prom, 
NEWSDAY, May 18, 2006, at A42. 
 3 Id. The dress copied from Bouwer’s design sold for less than $300. Id.  
 4 See La Ferla, supra note 1 (noting the proliferation of companies that 
specialize in “cranking out replicas” of dresses worn by celebrities to the Academy 
Awards show, with sales of such apparel totaling around $300 million a year). 
 5 Teri Agins, Designer Can Generate Buzz But Not Profits, STARTUP J.,  
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Wall St. J. Cent. for Entrepreneurs) (Sept. 19, 2005), http:// 
www.startupjournal.com/runbusiness/survival/20050919-agins.html (reporting on the 
“new generation of rising fashion stars struggling to follow the path of financial 
success” and noting the difficulties of turning a profit in the high-end fashion industry, 
in which designers cannot profit from economies of scale since only a relatively small 
number of garments are produced per design). 
 6 For a discussion of the current lack of legal protection against the 
unauthorized copying of fashion designs, see infra Part II.A. 
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The current copyright law, governed by the Copyright 
Act of 1976, does not explicitly protect “fashion,” although the 
Act does provide protection for “pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works,”7 so long as the works are not “useful 
article[s].”8 Nor does current copyright law protect “design,” 
with the exception of the Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act of 1990,9 which provides copyright protection for 
architectural designs; the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,10 
which provides protection for semiconductor chips; and the 
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998 (“VHDPA”), a 
recently enacted amendment to Title 17 that provides 
protection for the designs of vessel hulls.11  
To close what appears to be a gap in the scope of 
copyright protection, on March 30, 2006, U.S. Representative 
Robert Goodlatte introduced the Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
(“DPPA”), amending Title 17 to provide sui generis copyright 
protection for fashion design.12 Senator Charles Schumer 
introduced the Bill in the Senate on August 2, 2007.13 Under 
the terms of the DPPA, the VHDPA would be amended to 
include protection for fashion designs in addition to the vessel 
  
 7 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). “ ‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ 
include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans.” Id. §101. 
 8 Id. § 113; see infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. Protection has been 
provided to a broad range of works, ranging from portrait photographs, Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1884), to real estate ownership maps, 
Mason v. Montgomery Data, 967 F.2d 135, 135 (5th Cir. 1992), to statuettes of dancers 
used as bases of table lamps, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202, 213-14 (1954).  
 9 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2000). 
 10 Id. § 901-914. 
 11 Id. §1301. The VHDPA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, in which the designer of a fiberglass 
recreational boat unsuccessfully sought redress for the alleged unlawful duplication of 
the boat’s hull design under a Florida statute that prohibited copying another’s vessel 
design for commercial purposes without consent. 489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989). The Court 
invalidated the Florida statute on the grounds of federal preemption. Id. at 145. The 
VHDPA defines “vessel” as a “craft . . . designed and capable of independently steering 
a course on or through water through its own means of propulsion; and . . . designed 
and capable of carrying and transporting one or more passengers.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(b)(3) (2000). A “hull” is defined as “the frame or body of a vessel, including the 
deck of a vessel, exclusive of masts, sails, yards, and rigging.” Id. § 1301(b)(4).  
 12 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); 
Goodlatte Introduces Legislation Granting Protection to Fashion Designs, 71 PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 615, 615 (2006).  
 13 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007). References 
throughout this Note cite to H.R. 5055, the bill introduced in the House of 
Representatives; however, since the two bills are identical the analysis applies equally 
to S. 1957, the bill introduced in the Senate. 
2008] DEFINING FASHION 731 
hull designs currently protected under the Act.14 “Fashion 
design” is defined under the proposed amendment as “the 
appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its 
ornamentation.”15 The Bill further specifies that “[t]he term 
‘apparel’ means . . . an article of men’s, women’s, or children’s 
clothing, including undergarments, outerwear, gloves, 
footwear, and headgear; handbags, purses, and tote bags; belts; 
and eyeglass frames.”16 As of this writing, Congress has not yet 
voted on the DPPA. 
The Bill, however, seems to raise more questions than it 
answers. For example, what constitutes “fashion design” under 
the DPPA? What constitutes “apparel”? While the Bill purports 
to define these terms, there remains a risk that the legislation, 
if interpreted broadly, will protect too much in light of its 
purpose.17 At the same time, there is also a risk that, if 
interpreted narrowly, the legislation will not cover enough—
that it will miss some items that should be protected.18 If the 
Bill is enacted, courts will need to undertake a case-by-case 
analysis to determine whether a given item constitutes a 
“fashion design” under the legislation. This case-by-case 
analysis will lead to unpredictable outcomes. For example, one 
court might take a narrow approach to interpreting the 
legislative language by protecting a designer’s rainboots as 
“footwear,” but denying protection to the same designer’s 
umbrellas because “umbrellas” are not explicitly listed under 
the definition of “apparel.”19 Another court might take a 
  
 14 H.R. 5055.  
 15 Id. § 1.  
 16 Id.  
 17 See infra Part III.  
 18 See infra Part III. It is not clear whether from a policy perspective fashion 
design should be protected at all. Commentators have expressed mixed opinions about 
the effect copyright protection would have on the fashion industry. See, e.g., Jonathan 
M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, 
Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1422 (2005) 
(questioning “the assumption that counterfeiting unambiguously harms incentives to 
invest in the fashion-goods industry by depriving producers of a portion of their 
investment proceeds”); Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out to Dry: Clothing Design 
Protection Pitfalls in United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 169, 171 
(2002) (arguing that “the enactment of clothing design protection laws would benefit 
both U.S. consumers and clothing designers”); Safia A. Nurbhai, Note, Style Piracy 
Revisited, 10 J.L. & POL’Y, 489, 494 (2002) (recommending that “Congress extend the 
boundaries of copyright protection . . . to reward the efforts of fashion designers”). This 
Note will not address the normative question of whether fashion should be copyrighted, 
but rather will examine the ways courts may interpret the DPPA if it is enacted into 
law. 
 19 H.R. 5055; see infra note 183 and accompanying text.  
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broader approach when interpreting the legislation to decide 
that although a man’s wallet is not on the list of items defining 
“apparel,” it is nevertheless covered under the statute’s 
provision for accessories.20 Such different treatment of the 
designer umbrella and the wallet would be arbitrary and 
unfair. Moreover, if the court in either scenario had taken the 
other court’s interpretive approach, the outcome would likely 
be different: the umbrella may have received protection under 
the second court’s broad approach, and the wallet may not have 
received protection under the first court’s narrow approach. It 
is difficult for litigants to predict how a given court will 
interpret the statute with regard to their specific case.  
This Note will therefore examine the potential problems 
relating to the scope of the legislation and the various 
approaches courts will likely take in interpreting the term 
“fashion design” if the Bill is enacted into law. Part II will 
review the background of the DPPA, including the current 
state of copyright law protection for fashion design. It will 
provide a brief overview of the fashion industry, as well as the 
history and purpose of the proposed legislation. Part III will 
suggest that there are significant risks that the proposed 
legislation will be interpreted in ways that are both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive in light of its purpose. Part IV 
will address the various approaches courts may take in 
interpreting the legislation. Part V will discuss the likely 
outcomes under each approach. Part VI will predict that courts 
will use a variety of interpretive approaches in any given case, 
and will offer suggestions as to how Congress can provide 
courts with greater guidance in interpreting the statute so that 
judicial outcomes under the legislation will be more predictable 
and consistent with its purpose.  
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE DPPA 
Currently, there is minimal copyright protection for 
fashion and designers face what are often insurmountable 
hurdles in obtaining protection for their designs.21 The lack of 
legal protection is greatly reflected in the fashion industry, in 
which there is a substantial amount of copying within and 
between various parts of the industry.22 In response to this 
  
 20  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 21 See infra Part II.A.  
 22 See infra Part II.B.  
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state of affairs, the DPPA was introduced to protect fashion 
designers from piracy.23 
A.  Copyright Protection for Fashion: The Current State of 
the Law 
At present, fashion designers have practically no 
redress in the courts if someone copies their designs, as fashion 
designs are rarely protected by copyright law or any other area 
of intellectual property law.24 The current Copyright Act seems 
to sweep broadly, providing protection for “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”25  
and stipulating a list of categories of “works of authorship” 
subject to copyright protection.26 While neither “fashion” nor 
“design” is included on that list, clothing apparel would seem  
to fall within the “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”27 
category. However, the Act specifically limits the scope of 
copyright protection under this category, providing that 
designs of “useful articles” are not protected.28 “Useful articles” 
are works that have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to 
  
 23 See infra Part II.C. 
 24 See generally Briggs, supra note 18, at 170-71 (outlining “the shortcomings 
in current patent, copyright, and trademark laws with respect to clothing designs”); 
Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways Are No Longer the Public Domain: 
Applying the Common Law Right of Publicity to Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43, 44 (2001) (“Under present United States intellectual 
property law, clothing design is not protected by federal copyright, trademark/trade 
dress, or patent law, nor is it protected by any state intellectual property regime.”);  
S. Priya Bharathi, Comment, There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat: The 
Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1667, 1672 (1996) (noting that current focus on copyright protection for fashion 
design is “due to the ineffectiveness of other bodies of law in handling the problem”); 
Julie P. Tsai, Note, Fashioning Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion Designs 
in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 452 (2005) (providing overview of 
trademark, patent, and copyright law and discussing how these areas of the law “are 
currently problematic when applied to protection of fashion designs”). 
 25 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 26 Id. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) 
literary works; (2) musical works . . .; (3) dramatic works . . .; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. § 101(7) (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the 
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”); see 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property 
§ 31.  
734 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
portray information.”29 For example, at least one court has held 
that automobile hubcaps are not protected as “sculptural” 
works because hubcaps are useful articles.30 An exception is 
made for aspects of a work that “can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”31 In the case of the hubcaps, 
the court found that the ornamental aspects of the wheel 
coverings could not be separated from their utilitarian 
aspects.32 These provisions of the Copyright Act, commonly 
referred to as the “useful articles doctrine,” reflect Congress’ 
desire to restrict from copyright protection articles that serve 
utilitarian or functional purposes.33  
Generally, courts have considered clothing to be “useful 
articles” and therefore not protected by the Copyright Act.34 
Although in a few fringe cases designers have attempted to 
bypass the useful articles doctrine by arguing that the item in 
question was actually art (rather than clothing),35 or that the 
aesthetic elements of the item in question were separable from 
the useful quality of the item,36 the results of these rare cases 
  
 29 Id.  
 30 Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 923-24 (11th Cir. 
1983).  
 31 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 32 Norris, 696 F.2d at 923. 
 33 See Briggs, supra note 18, at 181. The rationale is that these types of 
works are more valuable to the public and so should not be given the same monopoly-
like protection as other copyrighted works. Useful works are more properly the subject 
of patent protection. Id. at 181-82. 
 34 See, e.g., Lim v. Green, 243 F.3d 548, 2000 WL 1693680 *1 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[I]t has long been established that clothing designs are not subject to copyright 
protection.”); Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., Inc., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“We have long held that clothes, as useful articles, are not copyrightable.”); 
Morris v. Buffalo Chips Bootery, 160 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[I]tems of 
clothing are, as a general rule, uncopyrightable ‘useful articles.’”); Eve of Milady v. 
Impression Bridal, Inc., 957 F. Supp 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is firmly established 
in the Second Circuit that clothes are not copyrightable.”). 
 35 In Poe v. Missing Persons, the plaintiff, “an artist and fashion designer 
whose clothing styles are recognized in the fashion world,” argued that his creation was 
a “three-dimensional work of art in primarily flexible clear-vinyl and covered rock 
media,” a sculpture that qualified for copyright protection. 745 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th 
Cir. 1984). The defendant argued that the item was actually a bathing suit, which 
served a useful purpose. Id. at 1239. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a genuine issue 
of material fact existed as to whether the work was a copyrightable piece of art or a 
non-copyrightable swimsuit. Id. at 1243. But see Morris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 720-21 
(flatly rejecting plaintiff-designer’s argument that the items in controversy, the leather 
But-N Up Vest and Apron Dress, were actually art, not clothing, and therefore subject 
to copyright protection).  
 36 Courts have developed various approaches to determine whether a given 
work that contains both aesthetic and utilitarian features constitutes a “useful article” 
under the Copyright Act. When the functional part of the work can be physically 
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are confusing and inconsistent.37 Thus, under current copyright 
law, fashion designers face an uphill battle in acquiring 
copyright protection for their creations. Because of the useful 
articles doctrine their chances for success in infringement 
claims are slim.38  
B.  The Fashion Industry and Copying 
The fashion industry is a distinctive, sprawling and 
highly profitable sector of the United States and global 
economies, the parameters of which cannot be concisely 
defined.39 The industry includes everything from haute couture 
  
separated from the non-functional part of the work, courts will simply recognize 
protection in the non-functional part of the work. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 213-14 (1954). However, when the functional aspect of the work cannot be 
physically separated, courts determine whether the non-functional aspect can be 
separated conceptually. See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 
F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980). Numerous tests have been suggested for determining 
whether non-functional aspects of a work may be conceptually separated from the 
overall work as a whole. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 
F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 
411, 423 (2d Cir. 1985); Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. Fashion designer plaintiffs 
have succeeded in gaining at least partial copyright protection for their works on 
conceptual separability grounds in a handful of cases. Id. (copyright protection 
recognized in belt buckles because “[t]he primary ornamental aspect of the . . . buckles 
is conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function”); Animal Fair, Inc. 
v. Amfesco Indus., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 175, 177, 187 (D. Minn. 1985) (finding that the 
design features of a “slipper resembling a bear’s paw” are conceptually separable from 
the utilitarian aspect of the slipper and therefore subject to copyright protection). 
 37 A number of cases involving the copyrightability of costumes and masks 
illustrate the lack of consistency and predictability in these cases. In Nat’l Theme 
Productions v. Beck, Inc., the court found that certain costumes (the Tigress, Rabbit In 
Hat, Magic Dragon, and Pampered Pup) were copyrightable because their design and 
form did not have much to do with their suitability as “apparel.” 696 F. Supp. 1348, 
1353 (S.D. Ca. 1988). However, in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 1998 WL 
178856, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.), and Whimsicality, Inc. v. Battat, 27 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), the courts declined to recognize copyright protection for similar 
costumes (Lion, Bee, Stegosaurus, Frog, Ladybug, Turtle, and Lion); see also Chosun 
Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 325-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding 
this case addressing copyrightability of plush animal-themed Halloween costumes on 
the grounds that the trial court erroneously failed to apply the conceptual separability 
analysis because it found the separability tests to be incoherent); Briggs, supra note 18, 
at 184 (“This tangled spaghetti of separability tests is confusing and subjective to say 
the least.”). 
 38 See Briggs, supra note 18, at 180-84; Tsai, supra note 24, at 460.  
 39 See David Bollier & Laurie Racine, Ready to Share: Creativity in Fashion 
& Digital Culture, in READY TO SHARE: FASHION & THE OWNERSHIP OF CREATIVITY 29, 
39 (David Bollier & Laurie Racine eds., 2006) [hereinafter READY TO SHARE] (“It is 
difficult to find reliable numbers to describe the scale and scope of the fashion industry. 
It is a sprawling global enterprise consisting of many specialty clusters (apparel, 
accessories, fabric, etc.) with many interconnected and irregular players (designers, 
manufacturers, merchandisers, marketers, etc.).”); see also Kal Raustiala & 
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
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design houses,40 such as Chanel and Gucci, to mass-produced 
brands of apparel, such as those sold at discount stores, like 
Wal-Mart and Target.41 In their article on intellectual property 
and fashion design, Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman 
provide a helpful overview of the basic structure of the fashion 
industry.42 They view the fashion industry through a pyramid 
structure with three broad categories: a small “designer” 
category at the top, which includes haute couture and, just 
below it, designer ready-to-wear;43 a larger “better” fashion 
category in the middle, which includes moderately priced 
apparel (for example, Banana Republic); and an even larger 
“basic” or “commodity” fashion category at the bottom (for 
example, Old Navy, Wal-Mart).44 Raustiala and Sprigman 
recognize that “[t]he borders between product categories are 
indistinct,”45 but generally, “design content” and “design 
turnover” are greater toward the top of the pyramid, and price 
“increases as one ascends the pyramid.”46 Many fashion 
designers design apparel within multiple categories of the 
pyramid.47 
Within the trend-driven fashion industry, copying and 
“referencing” other designers’ work are exceedingly prevalent, 
both within and between the categories of the pyramid.48 Some 
  
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1693 (2006) (“The global fashion industry sells 
more than $750 billion of apparel annually.”). 
 40 “Couture” design houses produce “custom clothing designed almost entirely 
for women and sold at very high prices.” Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1693. 
 41 “There is no such thing as a ‘typical’ fashion enterprise—the sector consists 
of a broad spectrum of companies in apparel, textile and accessories ranging from the 
high-end couture houses to mass-produced, low-priced commodity goods.” Aram 
Sinnreich & Marissa Gluck, Music & Fashion: The Balancing Act Between Creativity 
and Control, in READY TO SHARE, supra note 39, at 47, 60. 
 42 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1693-95. 
 43 For definition of “haute couture,” see supra note 40. Designer ready-to-
wear includes prestige collections (e.g., Giorgio Armani, Dolce & Gabbana, Calvin 
Klein) and lower-priced bridge collections (e.g., Emporio Armani, D+G, CK Calvin 
Klein) of famous designers. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1693-94. 
 44 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 37, at 1693-94. 
 45 Id. at 1694 n.11. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. “For example, Giorgio Armani produces couture apparel, a premium 
ready-to-wear collection marketed via its Giorgio Armani label, differentiated bridge 
lines marketed via its Armani Collezioni and Emporio Armani brands, and a ‘better 
clothing’ line distributed in shopping malls via its Armani Exchange brand.” Id.  
 48 Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1457, 1459 
(D. Kan. 1995) (“Utilizing competitors’ design features is common practice in the 
fashion industry.”); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1727-28 (“Original ideas 
are few, and the existence of fashion trends typically means that many actors copy or 
rework the ideas of some originator . . . . Some may originate more than others, but all 
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clothing producers directly and intentionally copy the works of 
other fashion designers, often marketing the copies at 
substantially lower prices.49 Fashion magazines routinely 
feature articles instructing readers on where to purchase 
“knockoffs” of high-end fashion and couture pieces at prices 
well below those of the originals.50 Other clothing producers 
more subtlety allude to the works of other designers by 
reinterpreting or reinventing existing fashion designs.51 Many 
high-end fashion designers themselves admit to reinventing 
and elaborating on other designs.52 
It is unclear exactly how the prevalence of copying has 
affected the fashion industry and specific designers within it. 
Designers themselves have a range of views about copying.53 
  
engage in some copying at some point—or, as the industry prefers to call it, 
‘referencing.’”); see also Sinnreich & Gluck, supra note 41, at 56 (“Fashion is a chaotic if 
highly stratified industry, and the directional flow of aesthetics is now top-down, 
bottom-up, and side-to-side. Ideas flow in every direction . . . .”).  
 49 For example, Allen Schwartz, founder and designer of A.B.S., produces 
apparel such as evening gowns closely modeled after the designs of high-end fashion 
designers. According to his website, “He is revered and applauded for the extraordinary 
job he does of bringing the latest trends to the stores in record time.” A.B.S. by Allen 
Schwartz, http://www.absstyle.com (select “About Us” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 
2008). A New York Times journalist has noted that “fashion designers do not design so 
much as swipe from fashion industry” while reporting on the popularity amongst elite 
fashion designers of a Greenwich Village shop with a large collection of vintage fashion 
magazines. Guy Trebay, Ideas & Trends: Fashion Replay; Imitation Is the Mother of 
Invention, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, at 4.  
 50 Eric Wilson, O.K., Knockoffs, This Is War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at 
G1; Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1706-11 (illustrating this phenomenon 
with Marie Claire’s regular feature titled “Splurge or Steal”).  
 51 Some fashion experts argue that no new fashion design is truly unique—
that all new fashion is influenced by prior and existing designs. David Wolfe of the 
Doneger Group—a company specializing in “global market trends and merchandising 
strategies to the retail and fashion industry,” Doneger Group, http://www.doneger.com/ 
web/231.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007)—claims that “[a]ll fashion designs are merely 
rearrangements of existing elements that are used by all designers.” Anandashankar 
Mazumdar, Witnesses Clash on Need for Granting Copyright Protection to Fashion 
Designs, 72 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 360, 360 (2006).  
 52 See Trebay, supra note 49 (reporting on various instances of designers 
copying other designers: design house Balenciaga copied a vest from designer Kaisik 
Yoon’s collection; Marc Jacobs admitted to copying an Oscar de la Renta coat design; 
Yves Saint Laurent sued Ralph Lauren, accusing the design house of copying a tuxedo 
design; Adolfo copied Coco Chanel; Tom Ford copied Halson; Alexander McQueen 
copied Vivienne Westwood; Miuccia Prada copied a Balenciaga coat). As to the 
Balenciaga coat, Trebay quotes a photographer saying, “I mean copied it exactly.” Id.; 
see also Cathy Horyn, Is Copying Really a Part of the Creative Process? N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2002, at B10. 
 53 Wilson, supra note 50 (citing the National Retail Federation: “There is not 
a consensus on this issue [the permissibility of copying in fashion].”); Ben Winograd & 
Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Can Fashion Be Copyrighted? WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2006, at B1 
(noting that “designers . . . are hotly debating the issue”).  
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Some view it as flattering,54 some find it annoying, offensive, or 
just plain wrong,55 while others find it to be an unavoidable 
aspect of fashion design.56 Scholars have suggested various 
theories about the effects of fashion design piracy on the 
United States fashion industry. Some propose that copying is 
part of the nature of fashion design,57 the inevitable result of a 
trend-driven industry, or that it may even benefit the designers 
and the industry as a whole.58 Others argue that copying 
reduces designers’ incentives to create new designs (especially 
for emerging designers),59 generates inefficiencies in the 
industry resulting in higher costs for consumers and lower 
profits for designers,60 and threatens the United States’ 
position in the global fashion industry.61  
  
 54 Eric Wilson, Designers Take Legislative Aim at Knockoff Producers, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 12, 2006, at 6 (noting that for many years “leading designers” have 
considered copies of their work the “sincerest form of flattery”); see also Jenifer 
Johnston, Bitchiness Takes Centre Stage at Fashion Festival Catwalk: Edinburgh 
Matthew Williamson Wows Crowds with Collection, SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow, UK), 
Apr. 30, 2006, at 17 (quoting Matthew Williamson, fashion designer and creative 
director of Italian fashion house Pucci, “I think in a way if someone bought a copy or a 
design that shows elements of my work it is quite flattering . . . .”). 
 55 Wilson, supra note 50 (naming offended designers Behnaz Sarafpour, 
Diane Von Furtstenberg, Narcisco Rodriguez, and Zac Posen and noting that “leading 
designers are acknowledging that inexpensive copies . . . have negatively affected the 
luxury business”); Winograd & Tan, supra note 53 (reporting that designer Tracy 
Reese’s first thought upon discovering that her design was copied was “Can I sue them 
for this?”).  
 56 For example, designer Jeffrey Chow, whose $1000 gown was copied and 
sold for $245 by A.B.S., “sees only futility in trying to fight such copying.” Wilson, 
supra note 50. And designer Carmen Marc Valvo reports that he’s “been copied so 
much he now shrugs it off when he sees styles that imitate his work. He finds the idea 
of legislation ‘insane.’” Winograd & Tan, supra note 53.  
 57 See, e.g., Bollier & Racine, supra note 39, at 33 (“Fashion . . . always has 
been a form of creativity based on lineage. The individual designer may have his own 
distinctive talents, but he also participates in a recognized tradition.”). 
 58 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1689-92 (noting the “empirical 
anomaly” that despite a lack of intellectual property rights, “fashion firms continue to 
innovate at a rapid clip,” and advancing the “piracy paradox” theory, in which copying 
promotes innovation and benefits the original designers because (1) “the value of 
fashion items is partly status-based” and (2) “fashion is cyclical”); Barnett, supra note 
18, at 1382 (noting that “the fashion industry appears to sustain robust levels of 
investment in new product development even with widespread unauthorized 
imitation”). 
 59 Hearings, supra note 1, at 83 (statement of Professor Susan Scafidi, 
Southern Methodist University, noting that “there is strong anecdotal evidence that 
design piracy is harmful to the U.S. fashion industry” and describing the “race to the 
bottom in terms of price and quality” that designers lose to “knockoff artists”). 
 60 Professor Scafidi argues that the lack of protection against piracy for 
fashion designs “has led to multiple inefficiencies in the development of the U.S. 
fashion industry,” including designers bearing the costs of seeking legal remedies by 
attempting to stretch trademark, trade dress, and patent law to cover fashion. Id. at 
80; see also Briggs, supra note 18, at 210 (suggesting that “with no design protection 
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C.  The DPPA and the VHDPA 
Against this backdrop of unregulated copying and 
conflicting views on the effects of fashion design piracy, 
proponents of copyright protection for fashion design, including 
high-end designers such as Diane Von Furstenberg, Narcisco 
Rodriguez, and Zac Posen, along with the Council of Fashion 
Designers of America,62 began lobbying Congress to implement 
sui generis copyright protection for fashion design.63 On  
March 30, 2006, Representative Goodlatte introduced the 
DPPA in the House of Representatives.64 The proposed 
legislation would amend the VHDPA, which provides sui 
generis design protection for vessel hulls.65  
The VHDPA is drafted in a way that makes it relatively 
straightforward to add a new category of design to its scope of 
protection.66 The statute first sets out broad protection for 
“designs” of “useful articles” that are “attractive or distinctive 
  
laws, a designer must act quickly and charge a premium for new designs before the 
goods are copied and sold at lesser cost”); Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright 
of Fashion, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 121201, 45 (1997) (“The denial of copyright 
protection in garment designs sanctifies the outright theft of a designer’s creative 
work. This threat to marketplace viability actually drives up the cost of designer goods, 
resulting in fewer consumers being able to purchase the garments.”). 
 61 Hearings, supra note 1, at 82 (statement of Professor Susan Scafidi, 
Southern Methodist University, noting that “the U.S. can no longer compete with 
China and other centers of low-cost production on price alone” and therefore “the future 
of the U.S. economy will rest on the ability to develop and protect creative industries, 
including fashion design”); Briggs, supra note 18, at 211-12 (“Without action of any 
kind toward protection of clothing design, the U.S. risks the further deterioration of its 
already struggling apparel industry.”). Perhaps Congress will hold hearings to better 
determine the true effect of design piracy on the fashion industry if the Bill moves 
forward through the legislative process. 
 62 “The Council of Fashion Designers of America . . . is a not-for profit trade 
association of over 300 of America’s foremost fashion and accessory designers” with a 
mission “to advance the status of fashion design as a branch of American art and 
culture; to raise its artistic and professional standards; to define a code of ethical 
practices of mutual benefit in public and trade relations; and, to promote appreciation 
of the fashion arts through leadership in quality and aesthetic discernment.” Council  
of Fashion Designers of America, http://www.cfda.com/index.php?option=com_cfda_ 
content&task=about_the_cfda_display (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).  
 63 Wilson, supra note 50.  
 64 Goodlatte Introduces Legislation Granting Protection to Fashion Designs, 
supra note 12, at 615. As noted above, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) introduced 
a parallel bill that mirrors H.R. 5055 in the Senate on August 2, 2007. Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007). See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 65 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000). See supra note 11 (discussing the VHDPA).  
 66 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J., 1575, 1594 n.85 (2002) (“For the moment, the Act 
covers only vessel hulls, but some commentators suggest that only minor changes 
would be necessary to convert it to a more general intellectual property law to protect 
the configuration of manufactured products.”). 
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in appearance” so long as they comply with and are subject to 
the statute.67 Section 1301(a)(2) then specifies that the designs 
protected by the statute include “[t]he design of a vessel hull, 
including a plug or mold.”68 Under the DPPA, a subsection 
would simply be inserted directly below § 1301(a)(2), under the 
“Designs protected” heading, to add “fashion design” to the 
subject matter protected.69 In addition, three subsections would 
be added to the VHDPA’s “Definitions” section: 
(7) A ‘fashion design’ is the appearance as a whole of an article of 
apparel, including its ornamentation. 
(8) The term ‘design’ includes fashion design, except to the extent 
expressly limited to the design of a vessel. 
(9) The term ‘apparel’ means – 
(A) an article of men’s, women’s, or children’s clothing, including 
undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear; (B) 
handbags, purses, and tote bags; (C) belts; and (D) eyeglass 
frames.70 
Thus, the Bill would simply add “fashion design” to the type of 
designs listed as subject to protection under the statute, which 
currently includes only the designs of boat hulls, and would 
provide a definition of the term to qualify the scope of that 
protection.  
Moreover, under the proposed legislation, in order to 
receive protection a fashion design must be registered with the 
Copyright Office within three months after the design is “first 
made public.”71 Although the Copyright Office “is responsible 
for registering copyright claims submitted by authors or other 
copyright claimants,”72 an infringement suit may be brought 
even if the Office rejects the application, so long as the 
requisite formalities are complied with.73 A valid copyright 
registration is only treated by the courts as “prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in 
  
 67 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2000) (“The designer or other owner of an original 
design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinctive in 
appearance to the purchasing or using public may secure the protection provided by 
this chapter upon complying with and subject to this chapter.”). 
 68 Id. § 1301(a)(2).  
 69 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 70 Id. (paragraph breaks omitted). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Reconsideration Procedure, 69 Fed. Reg. 133 (July 13, 2004) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202, 211, 212). 
 73 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000). 
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the certificate.”74 Thus, it is ultimately up to the judiciary to 
determine whether an item is subject to the protection of  
Title 17 when infringement suits are brought, as the courts 
may reverse the Copyright Office’s determination of copyright-
ability.75  
The DPPA is currently only in the early stages of the 
legislative process, and thus a fuller legislative record is yet to 
be developed.76 The Bill’s preamble simply states that the Bill is 
meant “to provide protection for fashion design.”77 But the 
justifications advanced by Representative Goodlatte suggest 
that the Bill is intended to boost global promotion of the United 
States fashion industry, as well as to protect individual fashion 
designers, particularly up-and-coming designers, who have 
invested heavily in their work, from piracy that may cause 
damage to their reputation and financial profitability.78 In his 
speech introducing the Bill to the House, Goodlatte emphasized 
the short “production life cycle of fashion designers” and 
referred to the popularity of fashion designs garnered from “a 
fashion show or other event.”79 Short production cycles and 
fashion shows are most commonly associated with fashion in 
the “designer” category (that is, high-end designers) identified 
by Raustiala and Sprigman.80 Moreover, Goodlatte’s arguments 
  
 74 Id. § 410(c). 
 75 Id. 
 76 As of this writing, the Bill has been introduced in the House and referred 
to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property. Subcommittee 
hearings were held on July 27, 2006. A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. on H.R. 
5055, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/ 
109th/28908.pdf. On August 2, 2007, the Bill was introduced in the Senate in identical 
form to the House bill, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. GovTrack.us, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1957 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). No 
further legislative actions have been taken. 
 77 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 78 Upon introducing the bill in the House, Representative Goodlatte, invoking 
the United States Constitution, emphasized the need to provide incentives for fashion 
designers in order “to maintain America’s position as the world leader in innovation.” 
Speech of Hon. Bob Goodlatte to the House of Representatives, Mar. 30, 2006,  
available at http://pub.bna.com/ptcj/HR5055remarks.htm. He pointed out that “[m]ost 
industrialized nations provide legal protection for fashion designs,” while the United 
States does not. Id. In addition to focusing on America’s standing in the global market 
of creativity, he also emphasized the need to protect individual designers—their 
economic profits as well as their reputations. The current lack of protection, he argued, 
“prevents designers in our country from reaping a fair return on their creative 
investments.” Id.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1694 (“Apparel in the designer 
categories (couture, designer ready-to-wear apparel, and bridge) is characterized by . . . 
faster design turnover. Generally, apparel in the ‘better’ and basic categories . . . 
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that the legislation is needed to protect the profits and 
reputation of designers is most applicable to lesser-known 
designers within that category, since more established design 
houses are less likely to lose profits or suffer damage to their 
reputations when their designs are pirated.81 Testimony from 
the hearings and written statements submitted on behalf of the 
Bill also support the notion that the legislation’s purpose would 
be primarily to protect the fashion designs in the “designer” 
category of the fashion pyramid, especially those of young 
designers.82 Indeed, many of the Bill’s most ardent supporters 
are young, emerging designers,83 while many retailers who 
profit from pirated designs oppose it.84  
  
experience slower design change.”). Although, in principle, anyone can hold a fashion 
show during New York’s annual fashion week if they are willing to pay for it, “[t]he 
anchor brands of American fashion are accommodated first.” Josh Patner, Fashion 
Week FAQ: Your Nagging Questions Answered, SLATE, Feb. 7, 2005, http:// 
www.slate.com/id/2113109. 
 81 Tsai, supra note 24, at 448 (“As small business owners, new designers are 
the most vulnerable to piracy of their designs. . . . Larger businesses realize the 
advantage they have over smaller businesses with respect to design piracy.”); Winograd 
& Tan, supra note 53 (“[T]he U.S. bill’s supporters say that copying hurts young 
designers in particular.”). 
 82 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 82-83 (statement of Prof. Susan Scafidi) 
(“Young designers attempting to establish themselves are particularly vulnerable to 
the lack of copyright protection for fashion design, since their names and logos are not 
yet recognizable to a broad range of consumers. . . . [T]hey struggle each season to 
promote their work and attract customers before their designs are copied by 
established competitors.”); Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Jeffrey Banks, 
fashion designer) (“The famous designer with an established and substantial business 
might be able to withstand that assault, but it can absolutely derail the career of a 
young designer.”). These arguments have also been made by legal scholars advocating 
for stronger intellectual property rights for fashion design. See, e.g., Leslie J. Hagin, A 
Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the 
Proposal for Folding Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 341, 366 (1991) (“Copyright protection would most help . . . innovative, yet 
unestablished, fashion designers.”); Tsai, supra note 24, at 448 (“Piracy is . . . likely to 
be most detrimental to new designers,” who are also “most vulnerable to piracy of their 
designs.”). 
 83 Wilson, supra note 50. Zac Posen, a member of the Council of Fashion 
Designers of America, is only 27. Cathy Horyn, Fashion; Romance is in the Spotlight  
as Zac Posen Comes of Age, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at B7. Also lobbying for  
the legislation is Gela Taylor, designer for Juicy Couture. Council of Fashion Designers 
of America, http://www.cfda.com/index.php?option=com_cfda_content&task=about_the_ 
cfda_display&category_id=58 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). Juicy Couture is a fashion 
line that has recently taken off and is growing rapidly since the company was 
purchased by Liz Claiborne, Inc. in March 2003 as part of its “strategy of buying 
fledgling retailers’ brands.” Christopher Palmeri and Nanette Byrnes, To Live and 
Thrive in L.A.: Juicy Couture’s Founders are Spinning Gold from Valley Girl “Casual 
Chic,” BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ 
content/05_13/b3926094.htm; see also Rose Apodaca, On the Right Track: Juicy 
Couture, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Mar. 27, 2006, at 38B.  
 84 “Retailers have been concerned that they would be held liable as infringers 
if a registered design becomes part of their goods without the authority of the owner[.] 
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Therefore, in order to predict the ways in which courts 
may interpret the DPPA, and what is meant by the term 
“fashion design,” it is necessary to keep in mind that the Bill 
has been introduced largely to provide protection for top-tier 
designers, especially emerging designers, at a time when 
apparel receives little to no protection under current copyright 
law. 
III.  POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION  
With this background information in mind, would the 
proposed legislation, as currently written, effectively achieve 
its goal of protecting “fashion design”?85 How would the courts 
determine whether a given item falls within the protection of 
the proposed legislation? Although at first glance the scope of 
the Bill’s protection seems obvious, as most people have an 
intuitive understanding of what constitutes “fashion design” 
and the meaning of the terms listed under the definition of 
“apparel” (for example, “clothing,” “handbags,” and “belts”),86 
potential interpretive issues will likely emerge. 
On the one hand, the DPPA may be interpreted to 
provide copyright protection for too many items—articles that 
clearly are “apparel” but that nobody intended to protect.87 For 
example, sporting apparel such as skiwear, and protective 
clothing such as surgery apparel, could inadvertently fall 
within the scope of the Bill if interpreted narrowly, since 
technically a ski helmet is a form of “headgear” and surgical 
  
Some manufacturers do not believe that there should be protection because of the 
fickleness of public sentiment about fashions and the fear that [free] use of designs as a 
basis for newer fashions would be hindered if a fashion design law is enacted.” 
Protecting Clothing Designs—Fashion Design Law Proposed, WORLD PAT. & 
TRADEMARK NEWS, May 17, 2006, http://wptn.com/Mailing/May_17/details/crights/ 
notaro.html; see also Briggs, supra note 18, at 208 (noting that many apparel 
manufacturers have resisted opportunities for increased design protection in the past).  
 85 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 86 Indeed, the Copyright Office has issued a statement endorsing the 
legislative language of the Bill, which completely overlooks the potential problems 
surrounding the language defining the Bill’s scope. Hearings, supra note 1, 197-98 
(statement of U.S. Copyright Office). While the report lauds the administrative aspects 
of the copyright scheme (i.e., “term of protection” and “time frame for registration”) it 
does not comment on the merits of the definition of the terms “apparel” and “fashion 
design.” Id. at 208-12. Moreover, opponents of the Bill have yet to raise the scope issue 
as a potential weakness of the proposed legislation. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, 
85-89 (statement of Prof. Christopher Sprigman); Hearings, supra note 1, 13-15 
(statement of David Wolfe, Creative Director, The Doneger Group). 
 87 See supra Part II.C for purpose of the legislation. 
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apparel “clothes” its wearers.88 As such, cheap, mass-produced 
items from the lower categories of the fashion pyramid that do 
not entail much investment of time or energy from the designer 
could conceivably receive protection. Moreover, these items are 
not likely to increase the stature of the United States as an 
innovator in the global fashion industry. Will courts recognize 
copyright protection in these types of items if they satisfy the 
other requirements of the legislation?89 Where will courts draw 
the line as to what constitutes apparel that is “fashion” subject 
to protection, and what is merely plain and simple apparel? 
There is a significant risk that the Bill, as written, is over-
inclusive.  
On the other hand, the DPPA may be interpreted in a 
way that misses some items that clearly should receive 
copyright protection in light of both our intuitive notions of 
“fashion design” and the purpose of the Bill. Items into which 
designers have invested much time and energy and which 
undoubtedly fall into the “designer” category of the fashion 
industry pyramid could conceivably be discriminated against 
under the proposed statutory language. For example, designer 
unisex clothing90 and pet apparel91 could conceivably fail to 
qualify as “men’s, women’s, or children’s clothing,” but are 
designed by people who are recognized fashion designers, 
displayed on runways, and sold alongside other items of 
fashion design.92 Similarly, luggage items,93 men’s wallets,94 and 
  
 88 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1740 (questioning whether 
“protective clothing” and “sport apparel” “count as ‘fashion designs.’”). 
 89 The design must also be “original” and “attractive or distinctive” in order to 
receive protection. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(1) (2000).  
 90 See Joelle Diderich, Runways of Europe Sport Daring, Unisex Outfits, 
BUFFALO NEWS, July 5, 2006, at C1 (reporting on fashion collections by designers such 
as Jean Paul Gaultier and Kris Van Assche who “blur the distinctions between the 
genders”); Constance C.R. White, Review/Fashion; Touches of Spice in a Tepid Stew, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, at B9 (“The idea of unisex clothing is now as hackneyed as 
the boyfriend jacket . . . .”).  
 91 See Jill P. Capuzzo, Creatures Bask in High-End Comforts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2005, at 14NJ (reporting on the development of the pet industry and noting 
that “growth has been strongest in the high end of the market—[including] designer 
clothes”); Alex Kuczynski, Critical Shopper; A Boutique for Obedient Humans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at G4 (describing a pet store in Bridgehampton, N.Y., as a 
“miniature Neiman Marcus for dogs” offering designer dog “hoodies” and high-priced 
collars and accessories). 
 92 For example, Kris Van Assche, recognized as a “young designer” in the 
media, included unisex suits in his runway show in Paris 2006. Diderich, supra note 
90. Fashion for dogs has been developed by designers such as Nicole Miller, Alice + 
Olivia, and Burberry, and has been displayed in runway shows. See NBC Today Show 
(NBC Universal Inc. Apr. 6, 2006) (reporting on Paws for Style celebrity pet fashion 
show); see also Stephen G. Henderson, Beauty and the Leash; Pet Fashion Week Gives 
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backpacks95 designed by recognized fashion designers do not 
clearly fall within the category “handbags, purses, and tote 
bags.” Would such items receive protection? Or would courts 
interpret the statutory language in a broader way such that the 
legislation does not arbitrarily discriminate against these 
articles of fashion? 
IV.  JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF 
THE STATUTE 
If the DPPA is enacted, courts could take a variety of 
approaches to interpreting the meaning of the term “fashion 
design,” and, within the definition of fashion design, 
“apparel.”96 As yet, the VHDPA has not generated enough 
litigation to provide precedent for interpreting the terms of the 
statute. Only a small number of vessel hulls have been 
registered thus far,97 and only one case regarding infringement 
of a hull design has been litigated.98 Moreover, currently there 
  
Four-Footed Friends a Chance to Embrace Style, BALT. SUN, Aug. 27, 2006 (reporting 
on a fashion show for dog apparel “that either met or exceeded haute couture quality”). 
Burberry sells its dog trench coat on its website along with its signature coats for  
men and women, Burberry, Dog Trench Coat, http://www.burberryusaonline.com/ 
product/index.jsp?productId=1892739 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007), while Neiman 
Marcus carries velour dog hoodies by Juicy Couture alongside versions for humans, 
Neiman Marcus Online, http://www.neimanmarcus.com/store/catalog/47/search.jhtml? 
ip_state=&ip_autoSummarize=true&ip_perPage=15&orgUrl=%2Fstore%2Fcatalog%2F
47%2Fsearch.jhtml&srcText=dog (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).  
 93 See Vanessa Friedman, FT Weekend—Style: Showcase For Your Desires If 
You’re a Self-Respecting Globetrotter, You don’t Just ‘Need’ a Suitcase, FIN. TIMES (UK), 
May 27, 2006, at 7 (reporting that Prada’s “bubblegum pink alligator wheelie bag made 
a runway appearance” and Chanel had a “cream or black quilted version”); Edwina 
Ings-Chambers, FT Weekend—Style: Everyone Gets in on the ‘Big Bag is Better’ Thing 
Despite the Danger of Looking Like Santa’s Little Helper, the Supersized, ‘Sexy’ 
Accessory is Selling All Over, FIN. TIMES (UK), Oct. 21, 2006, at 10 (noting that 
“luggage has featured in fashion shows”). 
 94 For example, see designer Jack Spade’s collection of wallets for men. Jack 
Spade, Small Goods, http://www.jackspade.com/shop/home.php?cat=309 (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2008).  
 95 Designer Miuccia Prada included backpacks in a recent fashion show. Suzy 
Menkes, Sporty Marni Beats Prada’s Surgical Sexiness, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 28, 
2006, at 9.  
 96 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006). 
 97 From July 1999, when the first vessel hull was registered under the Act, to 
October 2003, only 156 designs had been registered, six were “in-process pending 
clarification of certain matters related to those claims,” and eight had been rejected by 
the Copyright Office. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE & U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10 (2003) 
[hereinafter Report]. 
 98 Maverick Boat Co. v. American Marine Holdings, Inc., 418 F.3d 1186 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
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are very few statutes that refer to “fashion design.”99 As a 
result, there is little precedent as to how courts will interpret 
the meaning of fashion.100 This section of the Note therefore 
suggests different approaches to statutory interpretation that 
courts may pursue based on the way courts in the past have 
made determinations about art and aesthetics in various other 
areas of the law.101 
A.  Approaching Aesthetics in the Law 
Professor Alfred Yen, in his article “Copyright Opinions 
and Aesthetic Theory,” poses the questions “What is art, and 
how should art be interpreted?” at the outset of his piece.102 His 
examination of the way in which courts approach this broad 
question in the context of copyright law provides a useful model 
  
 99 There is currently only one federal statute that lists the term “fashion 
design”: 20 U.S.C. § 952(b) (2000) (including “fashion design” in a list of terms defining 
the term “the arts”). There are eleven state statutes with the term “fashion design.” 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-8-102(2)(N) (2007) (under definition of “[t]he arts”), CAL. ED. 
CODE § 52485(a) (West 2006) (legislative findings about importance of home economics 
education); D.C. CODE § 39-202(3) (2007) (under definition of “arts”); FLA. STAT. 
§ 287.012(3) (2003) (under definition of “artist”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 9-1 (2006) (under 
definition of “[a]rts”); KY. REV. STATE. ANN. § 153.210(1) (West 2006) (under definition 
of “the arts”); MINN. STAT. § 129D.01(a) (2000) (under definition of “Arts”); id. § 471.941 
(2001) (under definition of “artistic organization”); OR. REV. STAT. § 316.838(2) (2005) 
(under definition of “art object”); id. § 359.010(2) (2005) (under definition of “[a]rts”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-903(a)(ii)(B) (2006) (listed as type of “arts and crafts” that 
department of state parks and cultural resources must oversee).  
 100 There are no cases interpreting the meaning of “fashion design” under 20 
U.S.C. § 952(b) (2000). Nor are there any cases interpreting the term in any of the state 
statutes listed supra in note 99.  
 101 This writer believes that comparing fashion design to art in the law is an 
intuitively reasonable analogy since both fashion design and art are creative, aesthetic 
forms of expression. Various statutes implicitly recognize the relationship between art 
and fashion, often including “fashion design” as a type of art in the statutory 
definitions. For examples, see supra note 99. In addition, legal commentators have 
suggested the comparison. See, e.g., Hetherington, supra note 24, at 56-57 (“It is clear 
that both designers and the public consider haute couture to be art.”); Bharathi, supra 
note 24, at 1668 (arguing that “fashion designers are comparable to artists”); Tsai, 
supra note 24, at 461 (arguing that “[f]ashion designers are artists and the medium 
they work with is clothing”). Professor Susan Scafidi explains the distinction between 
“clothing,” which is merely something that covers the body, and “fashion”—“a form of 
creative expression.” Hearings, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Susan Scafidi). She 
analogizes fashion designers to “visual artists,” explaining that both designers and 
artists have “blurred the distinction between art and fashion by designing unique 
works of art in the shape of clothing.” Id. at 80. She points out that fashion is not based 
merely on utilitarian or functional goals, but is a form of creative expression. Id. at 79. 
She notes a recent cultural shift in recognizing fashion design as a type of art form, as 
evidenced by recognition from institutions like the Smithsonian, Sotheby’s, the 
National Arts Club, and the Cooper-Hewitt Design Museum. Id. at 81. 
 102 Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
247, 252 (1998). 
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with which to approach the issue of how courts would answer 
the more specific question: “what is fashion design, and how 
should fashion design be interpreted under the DPPA?”103 In 
answering the question he sets for himself, Yen presents an 
overview of major movements from aesthetic theory—
formalism, intentionalism, institutionalism, and reader-
response theory—and illustrates “the striking parallels 
between aesthetic reasoning and the legal reasoning of 
copyright opinions.”104  
The three main theories of how courts determine what 
is art outlined by Yen—formalism, intentionalism, and 
institutionalism—may be instructive in terms of how courts 
will likely interpret the meaning of “fashion design.” In the 
context of interpreting whether a given work is “art” under the 
formalist approach, a court looks at a particular work and 
determines its status as art based on the work’s inherent 
identity as an art object. In other words, “Interpretation 
becomes an objective empirical inquiry devoid of personal 
views.”105 Under the intentionalist approach, a court looks at 
the intention of the creator of the object and classifies the 
object as “art” based on whether that person perceives the 
object to be art.106 Under the institutionalist approach, a court 
defines “art” based on what the “art world” deems to be art.107 
Yen recognizes that each theory has its shortcomings, and 
courts are not consistent in their use of one theory over 
another; rather, they intuitively adopt one or another 
depending on the facts of the case.108 Which approach(es) would 
courts take in interpreting the meaning of “fashion design” 
  
 103 See supra note 101 (discussing the connection between art and fashion 
design).  
 104 Yen, supra note 102, at 251-52. Yen examines the applicability of aesthetic 
theory specifically to the copyright law doctrines of originality, useful articles, and 
substantial similarity. Id. at 252.  
 105 Id. at 262; see infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing cases taking this approach).  
 106 Yen, supra note 102, at 263. “Activity becomes artistic only if those who 
participate in it perceive it that way.” Id. at 256. See infra Part IV.C.1 for discussion of 
cases taking this approach. 
 107 Yen, supra note 102, at 259 (“[O]bjects become art when someone who 
believes that he is a member of the artworld invites others to view the object 
aesthetically.”). See infra Part IV.C.2 for discussion of cases taking this approach. 
 108 Yen, supra note 102, at 260 (“[T]he theories will continue to exist in 
tension with each other, ready for use by viewers of art as circumstances may 
dictate.”); see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845-46 
(2005) (“Examples of almost every aesthetic theory can be found employed by a court 
that must decide whether an object is art. . . . Their invocation of these theories is 
intuitive, not deliberate.”). 
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under the DPPA? This will depend on whether the courts 
interpret the statute narrowly or broadly. 
B. Interpreting the Statutory Language Narrowly 
If courts interpret the DPPA narrowly, finding the 
definition of “apparel” to include an exhaustive list of items 
qualifying for protection, and interpreting each item on the list 
literally, (for example, “belt” and “handbag”), these courts will 
likely employ the formalist approach.109 The Copyright Office 
has made clear that the VHDPA is to be interpreted 
narrowly.110 A report prepared by the Copyright and Patent and 
Trademark offices in 2003 addresses “the scope of protection for 
an original design vessel hull.”111 It notes that although 
“[m]asts, sails, yards and rigging are components typical of a 
sailboat . . . the statute does not speak to other components of 
most boats” beyond the “hull of a vessel, ‘including the deck.’”112 
The report then states that the Copyright Office’s approach “in 
making registration has been to interpret § 1301 strictly,”113 
and therefore sailboat components such as masts, sails, yards, 
and rigging are not included within the scope of the statute. 
Although courts may make their own independent inter-
pretations regarding the copyrightability of particular works,114 
courts often give deference to the Copyright Office’s 
determination.115 Since under the DPPA the definitions of 
“fashion design” and “apparel” fall within § 1301 as well, the 
proposed legislation may also be construed strictly.116  
In addition, the proposed legislation may be interpreted 
narrowly if courts consider the legislative intent regarding the 
interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 1301 when it was originally 
  
 109 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the formalist approach). 
 110 Report, supra note 97, at 14. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 16. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 115 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1956) (Courts “ordinarily give 
weight to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its 
administration.”). See, e.g., Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286-87 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s “longstanding practice of denying 
registration to short phrases”). 
 116 Further emphasizing that Congress intended the VHDPA to be interpreted 
narrowly, legislation was recently passed in the Senate that clarifies which parts of the 
vessel are subject to protection. The drafting approach is thus to be very explicit about 
the scope of the statute. Vessel Hull Design Protection Amendments of 2005, S. 1785, 
109th Cong. § 2-3 (1st Sess. 2005). 
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enacted as the VHDPA. Although the legislative history of the 
DPPA has yielded little debate thus far over its scope of 
protection, the Congressional Record for the enactment of the 
VHDPA reveals that Senators were concerned with scope 
issues and worried that the legislation would open the door for 
protection of industrial design on a broader level.117 Thus, if the 
DPPA is enacted, the statute may continue to be construed 
strictly in order to provide the most limited protection for 
design. 
1. The Formalist Approach 
Courts interpreting statutes narrowly often take a 
strict, formalistic approach to interpreting whether a given 
object falls within a list-like definition of a term.118 Staying 
within the realm of aesthetics, it is helpful to examine cases in 
which courts interpret statutes defining “art” using the 
formalist approach identified by Professor Yen.119 Sometimes, 
courts just declare that a particular object qualifies as an item 
listed under the scope of the statute without much explanation 
(presumably in those cases the status of the article was not 
questioned by the litigants).120 Similarly, courts sometimes 
assert that an object falls within the scope of a statute 
governing art-related items because of the object’s beauty and 
aesthetic qualities, or they make other subjective assessments 
  
 117 144 CONG. REC. S11887, S11889 (1998) (Senator Hatch expressing his 
concern “that this bill is not like traditional industrial design protection in that [it] 
protects the functionality of vessel hulls, not only its aesthetic aspects,” but stating 
that “because [it] is limited only to boat hulls . . . [he] could acquiesce in including it . . . 
as a limited experiment in design protection”).  
 118 See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 2003); Martin v. 
City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 
71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Petry Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. App. 525 (Ct. 
Cust. App. 1923); Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005); Scott v. Dixon, 
309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Tiffany v. United States, 66 F. 736, 736-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1895). 
 119 Farley, supra note 108, at 820-21 (“Oftentimes ‘art’ is statutorily defined as 
a list of subcategories of art, such as painting, sculpture, drawing, and photography, 
without any further definition. These statutes employ extensional definitions of art—
they simply define art by listing the things that are included under the term.”). 
Similarly the DPPA defines “apparel” by listing items included in the term, such as 
clothing, belts, and eyeglass frames. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th 
Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 120 See, e.g., Martin, 192 F.3d at 615 (referring throughout the opinion to an 
object depicted in a photograph admitted into evidence as a “sculpture” without 
discussing its qualifications as sculpture); Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (referring to a 
fifty-two-foot-tall plywood and steel structure as a “tall sculpture” and “work of art” 
under VARA without discussing its qualifications as sculpture).  
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about the artistic merits of the work.121 Courts also invoke 
“common meaning” understandings of statutory terms, as well 
as dictionary definitions, to determine whether the object 
qualifies as an item listed in the statute.122 And courts are often 
reluctant to expand the meaning of a term listed in a definition 
to include “subcategories” of the term.123  
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate provides a good 
example of how courts may narrowly interpret an aesthetic 
term defined in a statute with a list of items.124 In that case, a 
sculptor brought suit under the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(“VARA”) and the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act 
(“MAPA”), seeking to prevent the destruction of his “public 
sculpture park.”125 Both statutes protect artwork against 
destruction in certain circumstances; VARA applies to “work[s] 
of visual art” while MAPA covers “fine art.”126 The plaintiff 
argued that the park as a whole, which contained sculptures 
  
 121 See, e.g., Tiffany, 66 F. at 736. The court found that “paintings upon fans 
made of silk and other materials” were dutiable as “paintings” rather than “silk” under 
customs statute. Id. The court explained: “No one who has the slightest knowledge of 
art can fail to see that in drawing, coloring, grouping and in attention to minute detail 
it is a painting of great beauty and merit. To call such a work of art ‘a manufacture of 
silk’ seems almost as irrational as to call the Venus of Milo ‘a manufacture of marble.’” 
Id. at 737; see also Carter, 71 F.3d at 84 (court found that parts of a sculpture were a 
single interrelated work after “the district court’s own inspection of the work”). 
 122 See, e.g., Pollara, 344 F.3d at 267 (in determining whether banner was a 
“work of visual art” subject to protection under VARA, the district court looked at 
dictionary definitions of “advertising,” citing the American Heritage Dictionary); Petry 
Co., 11 Ct. Cust. App. at 527 (in finding that mosaics are not “works of art” under 
Tariff Act of 1913, the court consulted a dictionary definition of “mosaic”); Lilley, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d at 86 (“[T]he statutory term ‘still photographic image’ in Section 101 has a 
plain and unambiguous meaning. It is clear from a plain reading of the statute and the 
specific context in which the language is used that both photographic prints and 
negatives qualify as ‘still photographic image[s]’ and that both therefore are eligible for 
protection as ‘work[s] of visual art’ under VARA.”). 
 123 See, e.g., Petry Co., 11 Ct. Cust. App. at 528 (declining to interpret the 
category of “works of art” under the Tariff Act of 1913 to include mosaics since they are 
“not specially provided for in the law”); NASCAR v. Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d 515, 529 
(E.D. Pa. 2005) (declining to interpret “sculpture” under the 1976 Copyright Act to 
include plans for a trophy because the Act “excludes both ‘models’ and ‘technical 
drawings’ from the definition of works of visual art”); Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, 
205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (Ct. App. 1984) (declining to interpret “fine art” under the Art 
Preservation Act to include architectural plans because, “[e]ven if the inspiration that 
produces an architect’s plans may be ignited by the same creative spark that inspires 
poetry or music,” the Act does not list architectural plans and specifically excludes 
works “prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser”). 
 124 Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, 288 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass., 2003). 
 125 Id. at 92-93. 
 126 Id. at 96, 100.  
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that he had designed and placed within the space, was 
protected under both statutes.127  
The court first held that VARA did not protect the park 
as a whole.128 “Visual art” under VARA is defined in the 
Copyright Act as including “a painting, drawing, print or 
sculpture, existing in a single copy” or limited edition.129 Taking 
a narrow approach, the court found that the park was not 
“visual art” under the statute because it was not listed under 
the definition of the term, and it did not qualify as a 
subcategory of any of the terms listed.130 The park did not 
constitute “sculpture,” the court reasoned, because “a park does 
not fit within the traditional definition of sculpture” (citing 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary) and because “the 
definitions in VARA are to be construed narrowly.”131 Thus the 
court took a formalistic approach in finding that the park was 
not “visual art” under VARA. 
Underscoring the significance of the limiting quality 
imposed by a “list definition” of a statutory term, the court 
nevertheless found “a reasonable likelihood of success”132 
regarding the plaintiff’s argument that the park was protected 
under MAPA, which defines “fine art” as “any original work of 
visual or graphic art of any media which shall include, but [is] 
not limited to, any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft 
object, photograph, audio or video tape, film, hologram, or any 
combination thereof.”133 The court explained, “The definition of 
‘fine art’ in MAPA is significantly more expansive than the 
definition of ‘work of visual art’ in VARA because it is not 
limited to the specific enumerated types of art.”134 Thus the 
court found that MAPA applies much more broadly than 
VARA. 
The DPPA bears striking similarity to VARA. Like 
VARA, the proposed legislation protects a broad aesthetic term 
that is subject to multiple interpretations (“fashion design”) 
and then defines that term with a list of specific items without 
language such as “including, but not limited to” or a “catch-all” 
  
 127 Id. at 98-99, 101. 
 128 Id. at 99. 
 129 Id. at 97. 
 130 Id. at 99. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 102. 
 133 Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 134 Id. at 101. 
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category such as “and similar such items.”135 There is a strong 
likelihood that Congress will express its intention that the 
Bill’s definitions are to be construed narrowly, like the 
definitions in the VHDPA, just as Congress intended the 
definitions in VARA to be interpreted narrowly.136 Moreover, if 
the DPPA were enacted, it would become part of the same part 
of the United States Code as VARA—Title 17. Thus, courts 
may follow Phillips by construing the DPPA’s definition as an 
exhaustive list of items subject to copyright protection and take 
a strict formalist approach when determining whether an item 
falls within one of the explicit subcategories of “apparel” by 
referring to dictionary definitions and common understandings 
of each term.  
Although the Phillips court declined to find a park to be 
a type of sculpture under VARA, courts sometimes do recognize 
subsets of items listed in the definition of a term even under a 
narrow formalistic approach.137 For example, in Botello v. Shell 
Oil Co.,138 the court held that “mural” is a subset of “painting” 
under California’s Art Preservation Act, which provides 
protection to “fine art” and defines that term as “an original 
painting, sculpture or drawing, or an original work of art in 
glass, of recognized quality.”139 The court reasoned, based on 
dictionary definitions of the term “mural,” that a “‘mural is a 
subset of painting. Much as a rose is to a flower, or ring to 
jewelry, or sonnet to poetry.”140 Thus, the narrow approach 
leaves some flexibility for courts to find that certain items not 
specifically listed in a statute are protected, so long as these 
items can be understood to be subsets of items that are 
enumerated. In the case of the DPPA, a court may find that an 
evening clutch141 is protected under the term “handbag” or 
  
 135 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 136 See supra Part IV.B. The Phillips court noted that “Congress has provided 
a ‘narrow definition of works of visual art.’” 288 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (quoting Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 137 See, e.g., Tiffany v. United States, 66 F. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1895) ( “In 
ordinary parlance it is, perhaps, true that a painting is understood to mean a picture in 
oil or water colors, painted on canvas or paper, inclosed in a suitable frame and 
intended to be hung on the walls. . . . But such a definition is manifestly too narrow.”); 
Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (Ct. App. 1991).  
 138 280 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 139 Id. at 537.  
 140 Id. at 538. 
 141 Samantha Thompson Smith, It’s Big, Big, BIG: The Latest Gotta-Have-It 
Handbag Can Stop a Train in Its Tracks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 6, 
2006 (discussing the popularity of the expensive designer clutch as part of a woman’s 
handbag collection). 
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“purse” if it determines that a clutch qualifies as a subset of 
one of those terms. 
In sum, if courts take a narrow formalist approach to 
interpreting the DPPA, they will find that all items (but only 
those items) that are explicitly included on the list under the 
definition of “apparel” fall within its scope of protection. They 
will interpret those terms listed by referring to their intrinsic 
meanings, common understandings, and dictionary definitions, 
yet they may recognize that certain terms contain 
subcategories not explicitly listed. 
C. Interpreting the Statutory Language Broadly 
Courts may also take a broader approach to interpreting 
the DPPA by treating the list of items in the definition of 
“apparel” as merely suggestive of categories of protection. The 
Copyright Act specifically provides that the term “including” 
(which is part of the Bill’s definition of “apparel”142) is not 
meant to be a word of limitation.143 Courts have thus at times 
interpreted the Act liberally to provide protection for items not 
specifically listed in order to avoid inequitable results.144 If the 
DPPA were enacted into law, courts might similarly interpret 
it broadly to further the purposes of the statute and to avoid 
the problems associated with arbitrarily excluding certain 
types of fashion were the statute to be interpreted strictly. Yen 
identified two such methods as the “intentionalist” and 
“institutionalist” approaches.145  
1. The Intentionalist Approach 
Courts interpreting the DPPA may take the broad 
“intentionalist” approach identified by Professor Yen in order 
to determine whether something that is not explicitly included 
  
 142 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006) 
(“The term ‘apparel’ means—(A) an article of men’s, women’s, or children’s clothing, 
including undergarments, outerwear, gloves footwear, and headgear.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 143 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “including”).  
 144 For example, software is protected under the Copyright Act even though it 
is not listed in § 102 as a work of authorship. Aharonian v. Gonzales, No. C 04-5190 
MHP, 2006 WL 13067, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument 
that software is not protected because it is not explicitly listed in 17 U.S.C. § 102, 
noting that “the language of section 102(b) is deliberately open-ended, permitting 
flexible application of copyright law to evolving technology.”). 
 145  See supra Part IV.A.  
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in the statute should nevertheless fall within its scope.146 Under 
this approach, courts consider the creator’s intention in 
determining the item’s identity or purpose and thus whether it 
falls within the meaning of a statutorily defined term.147 Courts 
may listen to the creator’s testimony at trial148 or may look to 
external signs of his or her intent at the time of creation.149  
For example, in NASCAR v. Scharle, the court looked at 
both the plaintiff’s characterization of his work as well as his 
external conduct regarding its creation in determining that his 
trophy designs did not qualify as “visual art” within the scope 
of VARA.150 The court noted that in his testimony, the plaintiff 
disclosed that he never expected his trophy designs to be 
displayed as independent works of art but that he viewed them 
merely as preliminary sketches to be used in the process of 
creating a three-dimensional trophy.151 Also significant to the 
court’s finding that the plaintiff’s designs were not “works of 
visual art” was the fact that he had created the designs “with 
extreme exactness” in order to be more useful to technicians 
“later in the manufacturing process.”152 The court found this to 
  
 146 See supra Part IV.A. 
 147 See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 2003); Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 
88-89 (D.D.C. 2005); NASCAR v. Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d 515, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2005); 
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 148 See, e.g., Carter, 71 F.3d at 84. (noting that the trial court found that 
installation art in the lobby of a commercial building satisfied the Copyright Act’s 
“positive definition of a work of visual art” as a single work based partly “on 
testimony . . . of the artists themselves”); see also NASCAR, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 529; 
Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (in determining whether a sculpture park was protected 
under VARA, considering the plaintiff-artist’s belief that his sculptures were “visual 
art”); Lilley, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 86, 87 (in finding that photographic prints were not 
produced “for exhibition purposes only” under VARA, noting that “[w]hile it may 
appear simple to distinguish between an amateur photographer taking snapshots on 
vacation and an artist producing photographs ‘for exhibition only,’ few artists would 
characterize their work as the latter”).  
 149 See, e.g., Pollara, 344 F.3d at 270 (“[T]he directions given by [the 
commissioner of the work] evidence the promotional and advertising purpose that 
bring the banner outside the scope of VARA.”); Lilley, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89 (noting 
that a photographer’s actions evidenced that certain prints were not created solely for 
exhibition purposes); Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (in determining whether a 
sculpture park was protected under VARA, noting plaintiff-artist’s promotional 
brochures describing his “artistic vision” and his artistic input into the creation of the 
park). But see Peters v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 195, 199 (Cust. Ct. 1958) (finding 
that a collage was not protected as a painting under the Tariff Act of 1930 even though 
there was “documentary evidence indicating that it [was] regarded by the artist . . . as 
a painting”).  
 150 NASCAR, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29.  
 151 Id. at 529. 
 152 Id. 
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be objective evidence that at the time of creation the artist did 
not intend to produce a “work of visual art.”153 
Courts could similarly take into account an apparel 
designer’s intent with regard to whether an item falls under 
the scope of the DPPA. Designers could be called upon to testify 
as to whether they think of their creations as “fashion designs,” 
whether they intend to include the items in their runway 
shows or as part of one of their seasonal collections, or whether 
they intend to market the item as designer fashion apparel. 
Courts could also consider objective evidence of a designer’s 
creative input and the purpose for which the garment was 
designed, following the approach in NASCAR.154 
2. The Institutionalist Approach 
In addition to considering the intent of an item’s 
creator, courts frequently consider the opinions of experts to 
determine whether a particular item falls within the scope of a 
statute. This is the “institutionalist” approach identified by 
Professor Yen.155 Under this approach, courts take into account 
the opinions of those with expertise in the relevant field to 
determine whether an item falls within the scope of a 
statutorily defined term.156 For example, when courts interpret 
statutes governing art, they often look to what the “art world” 
considers to be art.157 They may look at whether the item has 
been displayed in a museum or gallery,158 whether it has 
  
 153 Id.  
 154 For example, a dress designed specifically for a celebrity to wear to the 
Academy Awards Show, an event where celebrities are expected to wear “top-tier” 
fashion, would clearly evince the creator’s intent to produce a “fashion design.” See Guy 
Trebay, Fashion Diary: For Designers, an Image-Making Bonanza That Is Priceless, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at E1 (“[T]he Oscars are a designer bonanza.”).  
 155 See supra Part IV.A.  
 156 See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 74 (1892); Martin v. 
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 
77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Peters v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 195, 198-99 (Cust. Ct. 1958); 
Hunter v. Squirrel Hill Assoc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 517, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Scott v. Dixen, 
309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 157 See, e.g., Perry, 146 U.S. at 74; Martin, 192 F.3d at 610; Carter, 71 F.3d at 
84; Hunter, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 518; Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 396; Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 
2d at 93. 
 158 See, e.g., Perry, 146 U.S. at 74 (noting that stained-glass windows are 
“ordinarily classified in foreign exhibits as among the decorative and industrial, rather 
than among the fine, arts” in finding that they did not qualify as “paintings” under the 
Tariff Act of 1890 in this case); Martin, 192 F.3d at 610 (considering the plaintiff-
creator’s evidence that “his works have been displayed in museums” in finding that a 
sculpture was protected as a work of “recognized stature” under VARA); Scott, 309 F. 
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received an award for artistic achievement,159 or whether the 
item or its creator has been recognized in some way by the art 
world.160 They also may give significant weight to the testimony 
of art experts.161  
The United States Customs Court took an institu-
tionalist approach in Peters v. United States,162 holding that a 
“collage”—“executed in the medium of burlap pieces, sewn, the 
whole pasted or otherwise affixed to a back, and with oil paints 
applied”163—was an “original work of art.”164 The court relied on 
  
Supp. 2d at 396 (considering the plaintiff’s testimony that galleries exhibited her work 
in its determination of whether an object was a work of recognized stature under 
VARA); Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (considering that the creator’s “work is 
exhibited in galleries and museums in New York City, Maine, and elsewhere” in its 
determination of whether a sculpture park fell within the scope of VARA and MAPA). 
 159 See, e.g., Martin, 192 F.3d at 610 (noting that plaintiff-creator received a 
prize from the Annual Hoosier Salem Art Show in finding that a sculpture was a work 
of recognized stature under VARA); Hunter, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (in recognizing that 
a mural qualified as a work of recognized stature under VARA, noting that it “enjoyed 
media attention and several public commendations, including a landscape design 
award from the American Society of Landscape Architects . . .[,] first prize in the 
Pennsylvania Horticultural Society’s City Garden Contest. . . . [and], the City Council 
of Philadelphia recently honored Plaintiff for her work on the mural”). 
 160 See, e.g., Perry, 146 U.S. at 75-76 (noting that the stained-glass windows in 
question were not distinguished from other types of stained-glass windows “in the 
catalogues of manufacturers and dealers in stained glass” and that they were 
“advertised and known to the trade as painted or stained glass windows”); Martin, 192 
F.3d at 610-12 (noting that plaintiff-creator held “various art degrees,” that the 
sculpture received attention from the “art community,” and that plaintiff proffered 
“newspaper and magazine articles, and various letters, including a letter from an art 
gallery director and a letter to the editor . . . in support of the sculpture” in finding that 
the sculpture was protected under VARA); Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (noting that 
plaintiff-artist had been referred to in a periodical as a “contemporary American artist” 
and “achieved a measure of local notoriety as an artist” in determining whether his 
paintings were protected under VARA); Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 93-94 (noting that 
the creator “earned numerous commissions for sculptures at universities, private 
companies, and public spaces,” was “featured in art magazines,” and “enjoys a national 
reputation” in determining whether a sculpture park fell within the scope of VARA and 
MAPA). 
 161 See, e.g., Martin, 192 F.3d at 610; Carter, 71 F.3d at 84 (noting, without 
reaching the issue, that the trial court found that installation art in the lobby of a 
commercial building satisfied the Copyright Act’s “positive definition of a work of 
visual art” based partly on the testimony of expert witnesses); Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 
397 (noting that the plaintiff failed to “call any expert witness to testify as to whether 
the Sculpture had ever been reviewed by any member of the artistic community” in 
determining whether an object was work of recognized stature under VARA); Phillips, 
288 F. Supp. 2d at 92-96 (relying on testimony from “the Executive Director of the 
Urban Arts Institute at the Massachusetts College of Art . . . [and] the Director of the 
Architect Resource Group at Pembroke” to determine that “modern sculpture does not 
exist separate from its context,” that “the notion of sculpture has undergone a radical 
redefinition,” and that the park has been treated as a “sculpture of the environment” in 
determining whether a sculpture park fell within the scope of VARA and MAPA). 
 162 Peters, 41 Cust. Ct. at 195. 
 163 Id. at 198. 
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the expert testimony of the director of museum collections of 
the Museum of Modern Art (“MOMA”) in New York and of a 
modern art dealer and gallery owner from New York to 
determine that the object qualified as “an original work of the 
free fine arts, within the modern art field.”165 The court credited 
the plaintiff’s reputation in the art world, noting that his works 
had been exhibited in several museums, that a MOMA bulletin 
listed his work among the work of other renowned artists,  
and that a MOMA book featuring twenty-two painters and 
sculptors included the plaintiff as one of the artists.166 
Emphasizing the experts’ qualifications to testify about modern 
art, the court concluded that the collage was an “original work 
of art.”167  
Under the DPPA, courts may take an analogous 
approach in determining whether an item is a “fashion design,” 
relying on the testimony of fashion industry experts and other 
external evidence of the industry’s validation of the work. Just 
as courts interpreting statutes about art look at whether the 
object in question has ever been displayed in a museum or 
gallery, courts interpreting the Bill may look at whether the 
item in question has ever been sold in “fashionable” 
department stores, such as Bergdorf Goodman in Manhattan 
and Barneys New York, or included in an elite fashion show. 
Courts may also look at whether the fashion design or designer 
has been recognized in the fashion media or received any 
awards.168 
3. Consideration of the “Type” of Item Protected 
Some courts interpreting the DPPA broadly may not 
follow either the intentionalist or the institutionalist approach. 
Rather, they may infer that a particular item is protected as a 
“fashion design” even when it is not explicitly listed under the 
definition by analogizing to other cases or finding that the item 
falls within the general “type” of item protected by the Bill. 
  
 164 Yet the collage did not qualify as an original painting under the Tariff Act 
of 1930, which did not classify “collage” as a type of work subject to the statutory 
provision. Id. at 199. 
 165 Id. at 198. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 199. 
 168 For example, the CFDA awards. Ginia Bellafonte, Front Row; Rousing a 
Fashion Award Show, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2000, at B9 (reporting on fashion award 
ceremony).  
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Under one approach, courts may interpret the statutory 
language in a looser manner by treating the list of terms 
included under the definition of “apparel” (for example, 
“handbags,” “belts,” “eyeglass frames”) as merely suggestive of 
the types of works subject to the Bill’s protection, and by 
making broad interpretations of each individual term on the 
list. In Friedrich v. Chicago, Judge Posner took this approach 
in holding that expert witness fees were recoverable under a 
civil rights attorney fee statute providing that “the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs” paid by the loser.169 Although 
the statute explicitly granted attorney’s fees, and said nothing 
about fees for experts, Posner noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had held that paralegal fees and lawyers’ out-of-pocket 
expenses, which are not “attorney’s fees” within the plain 
meaning of the term, nevertheless fell within the scope of the 
statute.170 He reasoned that given this broad approach to 
interpreting the term “reasonable attorney’s fees” to include 
such other expenses, Congress must have used the term “as a 
shorthand expression for such fees and other expenses as the 
district court might in the exercise of its equitable discretion 
reasonably believe should be reimbursed to the prevailing 
party.”171 Thus, expert witness fees are recoverable, even 
though they are not literally “attorney’s fees” or a subset of 
that term. 
In the case of the DPPA, the terms employed in the 
statutory definition of “apparel” could also be interpreted as 
shorthand expressions for the fashion items they represent, as 
well as other fashionable apparel a court might believe is 
meant be protected. For example, a court might find that a 
suitcase falls within the scope of the statute because the term 
“tote bag” is a shorthand expression for all large bags used to 
carry around personal belongings.  
  
 169 Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated, 
Chicago v. Griedrich, 499 U.S. 933 (1991). Although Friedrich was vacated in light of a 
contemporaneous Supreme Court case that limited recovery of experts’ fees under § 
1988 to stipends for testimonial services, Congress amended the statute to accord with 
Posner’s interpretation. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102, 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 113(a)(2), 105 Stat. 
1071, 1079 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may 
include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.”) (emphasis added)). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 518. 
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Similarly, courts may read between the lines of a 
statute in interpreting a defined term by looking at the items 
listed in the definition of the term in conjunction with one 
another to determine what “type” of item falls within its 
meaning. For example, in one state court case, the court was 
required to determine whether a kitten was a “domesticated 
animal” under a statute that provided that “[d]omesticated 
animals’ includes, but is not limited to, sheep, goats, cattle, 
swine, and poultry.”172 Noting that the only animals listed in 
the statute were livestock, the court held that the term “is 
limited to livestock and does not cover domestic pets.”173 Kittens 
simply did not fall within the type of animal suggested by the 
list of animals included in the definition of the term. 
Conversely, items that are within the type suggested by the list 
but that are not explicitly enumerated may be protected.174  
A court could also interpret the term “fashion design”  
in the DPPA as including all apparel that falls within the  
same type as the items listed under the definition of the  
term “apparel.” Thus, a court could determine that if a rain hat  
is protected as “headgear,”175 a raincoat is protected as 
“outerwear”176 and rainboots are protected as “footwear,”177 then 
so too should umbrellas, a type of raingear like the other items, 
be protected. Or a court could determine more generally that 
the type of item listed in the statute includes accessories, and 
therefore a man’s wallet should be covered even though it is not 
explicitly listed since a wallet is a type of accessory.  
In sum, if courts interpret the DPPA broadly, they may 
find that an item not explicitly listed under the definition of 
“fashion design” and “apparel” nonetheless falls within the 
Bill’s scope of protection. In so doing, they may consider the 
intent of the item’s creator in producing the work. They may 
  
 172 McKinney v. Robbins, 892 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ark. 1995) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-19-102).  
 173 Id. at 504. 
 174 But see Petry Co., 11 Ct. Cust. App. at 527 (finding that mosaics are not 
paintings under the Tariff Act of 1913 even though the statutory list definition of art 
should not be interpreted as exhaustive, and even though “[i]t is probably true that 
mosaic pictures like the present one are more nearly allied than other mosaic articles 
to works of art such as are specified in [the Act’s provision protecting paintings]”); 
Peters v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 195, 199 (Cust. Ct. 1958) (holding that although a 
collage was an “original work of art,” it does not fall within the scope of the statute, 
which does not include “collage” as one of its enumerated art forms).  
 175 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006).  
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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also consider the opinions of experts or other outside 
institutions from the fashion world with regard to the item. Or 
they may infer that the item was meant to be protected based 
on the other types of items that, per the case law or the 
statute’s plain meaning, are already protected.  
V.  THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES UNDER EACH OPTION 
No single approach outlined above will avoid all the 
potential scope problems of over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness. If the Bill is interpreted using a narrow, strictly 
formalist approach, the results could be either under-inclusive 
or over-inclusive.178 If the Bill is interpreted broadly, a strictly 
intentionalist approach would primarily be too broad, leading 
to significantly over-inclusive results,179 while a strictly 
institutionalist approach would lead to under-inclusive results 
and would be difficult for courts to implement consistently.180 
A. Potential Outcomes Under the Formalist Approach 
If courts interpret the DPPA in a strictly formalist way, 
the results would potentially be both over- and under-inclusive 
in light of the Bill’s purpose.181 Yen recognized this problem 
with the formalist doctrine as applied to art, posing four 
hypothetical scenarios, each of which “catches the formalist in 
a contradiction.”182 In the case of the DPPA, under a strictly 
formalist approach, the Bill would discriminate against types of 
fashion not enumerated on the list, and many items would be 
arbitrarily unprotected. For example, luggage, umbrellas, and 
pet wear by recognized designers of “top-tier” fashion would not 
receive protection183 since none of these items is explicitly listed 
under the definition of “apparel,” and they likely would not 
qualify as subcategories of any of the items listed under a strict 
  
 178 See infra Part V.A.  
 179 See infra Part V.B.  
 180 See infra Part V.C.  
 181 See supra Part III for potential problems of over- and under-inclusiveness. 
 182 Yen, supra note 102, at 254-55.  
 183 See Polly Blitzer, What’s Hot Now: Umbrella Stands, IN STYLE, Oct. 2006, 
at 400 (reporting on umbrella fashion trend amongst celebrities); Nadine Brozan, 
Chronicle, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at 7 (reporting on the popularity of umbrellas 
designed by fashion designer Nicole Miller); Maryellen Gordon, PULSE; Burberrys 
Downsizes Classic Brolly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, at 9 (discussing a new style of 
umbrella by fashion designer Burberry); supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text 
(fashion for pets), 93 and accompanying text (designer luggage). 
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interpretation. Therefore, if Burberry sent models down the 
runway clad in the design house’s signature trench coats, 
rainboots, and umbrellas, the coats and boots would fall within 
the scope of the statute while the umbrellas would not. The 
statute would be under-inclusive as there is no logical reason 
why umbrellas should be left vulnerable to copying while coats 
and boots receive protection. Meanwhile, the Bill might provide 
protection to items that were never meant to be protected, such 
as cheap mass-produced tote bags or belts sold on the street or 
in discount stores, as well as sporting apparel and protective 
apparel, since these items fall specifically within the list under 
the definition of “apparel.”184 Thus, under a strictly narrow, 
formalist approach, the Bill would be arbitrarily over-
protective in some areas and under-protective in others.  
B. Potential Outcomes Under the Intentionalist Approach 
If courts employ a strictly intentionalist perspective to 
interpret the DPPA, the result would likely be a significant 
amount of over-inclusion, as well as a minor amount of under-
inclusion, of items protected. Yen criticized the intentionalist 
approach in the context of art, explaining that “the definition of 
art will become too broad,” thus “cheapening” the meaning of 
the term.185 He also pointed out that as a practical matter, 
“evidence of an author’s intention is often missing or 
unclear.”186 Similarly, in the context of the DPPA, all creators of 
apparel from all levels of the fashion pyramid seeking 
protection under the statute could claim that they intended 
their creation to be “fashion.”187 Objective evidence of intent 
may be difficult to establish and not very credible since the 
creator’s intent is seldom reflected in the finished product of 
the fashion design.188 Therefore, cheap, mass-produced items, 
  
 184 See supra Part III.  
 185 Yen, supra note 102, at 258. 
 186 Id. at 264. 
 187 For an analogous situation, see Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 
1239-43 (9th Cir. 1984), and Morris v. Buffalo Chips Bootery, 160 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720-
21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that their creations were not 
useful articles of clothing, but rather non-utilitarian objects of art and therefore 
qualified for copyright protection. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1239; Morris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 
720-21. In Poe, the court remanded the case to the trial court to make the factual 
determination, 745 F.2d at 1243, while in Morris the court flat-out rejected the 
creator’s intent argument, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 721. 
 188 In contrast, objective evidence of the author’s intent may be available for 
other aesthetic works, such as the design plans for the trophy in NASCAR v. Scharle, 
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which are not intended to be protected, may nevertheless fall 
within the statute’s scope189 so long as the creator of the item 
can show that he or she intended to create fashion. Moreover, 
at least one well-known designer of top-tier fashion, Manolo 
Blahnik, does not identify himself as a fashion designer at all, 
but as an artist.190 His designs, as well as those of like-minded 
designers, would arbitrarily fall outside the scope of the 
legislation, even though most would agree that regardless of 
his intentions, Blahnik’s creations certainly qualify as 
fashion.191 Thus, at least some items from within the top tier of 
the fashion pyramid would be excluded from protection if 
courts focused solely on the intent of the creator. Under a 
strictly broad, intentionalist approach, the Bill would be largely 
over-protective and also in some cases under-protective as well. 
C. Potential Outcomes Under the Institutionalist Approach 
If courts employ a strictly institutionalist approach in 
interpreting the DPPA, the likely result would be under-
inclusion of items that should receive protection to further the 
purposes of the Bill, as well as significant unpredictability.192 
Many young, emerging designers—the designers that the 
statute is most clearly meant to protect193—may not receive 
immediate recognition and validation from the fashion 
industry, leaving their designs vulnerable under the statute. 
Moreover, some cheap, mass-marketed apparel that was not 
intended to be protected may nevertheless be recognized by the 
fashion media, thus posing a threat of over-inclusiveness if 
such items were recognized as “fashion design” merely because 
  
where the court found that the “extreme exactness” of the designs indicated that they 
had been created in order to be used as plans for a trophy, not simply as drawings. 356 
F. Supp. 2d 515, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 189 See supra Part III (discussing the purpose of the Bill and risk of over-
inclusiveness).  
 190 Jae-Ha Kim, Well-Heeled Stars Love Their Manolos, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2000, at 57 (quoting Manolo Blahnik saying “My shoes are not fashion. They are 
gestures; objects that happen to be fashion.”)  
 191 Blahnik’s stiletto shoes are regularly featured in fashion magazines and 
they have been recognized as “footwear icons.” In 1996, Blahnik received a special 
“Stiletto Award” from the Council of Fashion Designers of America. Sarah Lyall, 
Talking the High-Heel Walk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at 91; Saul Hansell, High 
Fashion Goes on Sale on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000, at C1; see also Phoebe 
Eaton, Who Is Jimmy Choo?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at 6102 (noting that “Blahnik 
remains the visionary against whom all other high-end shoemakers are judged”).  
 192 See supra Part II.C (discussing the purposes of the DPPA). 
 193 See supra Part II.C. 
2008] DEFINING FASHION 763 
of such publicity. For example, some women’s fashion 
magazines feature articles on clothing that looks like top-tier 
fashion, but which in reality comes from the lower tiers of the 
fashion pyramid.194  
However, the most significant problem that a court 
taking a purely institutionalist approach would face is 
determining how to define the “fashion world.” Yen 
acknowledges that in the case of art, “[t]o classify [objects] as 
artworks just because they are called art by those who are 
called artists because they make things they call art is not to 
classify at all, but to think in circles.”195 Similarly, in the 
context of fashion, defining “fashion design” as something that 
is recognized by the “fashion world” begs the question: what is 
the fashion world? Who qualifies as a fashion “expert” in the 
United States fashion industry, which is sprawling and 
difficult to define?196 While the fashion industry would seem to 
have the most institutional competence to make 
determinations about what constitutes “fashion,” courts may 
face significant difficulties in defining the industry, thereby 
making a solely institutionalist approach difficult to implement 
as well as potentially under-inclusive.197 
D.  No Perfect Solution 
Thus, no single interpretive approach will yield results 
entirely consistent with the DPPA’s objectives. If courts choose 
to employ a single approach for all interpretations of the Bill, 
this would inevitably result in protection for items that were 
never meant to be protected (the formalist approach and the 
intentionalist approach), or would leave unprotected items 
clearly meant to be protected (all three approaches), or would 
  
 194 For example, the items featured in the “steal” section of Marie Claire’s 
“Splurge or Steal” column, which often includes exact copies, such as A.B.S. by Allan 
Schwartz’s dresses, are featured by a women’s fashion magazine but are clearly not 
meant to receive protection. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 1705-11. 
 195 Yen, supra note 102, at 260 (quoting Monroe C. Beardsley, An Aesthetic 
Definition of Art, reprinted in AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART—THE 
ANALYTIC TRADITION 55, 60 (Peter Lamarque & Stein Haugom Olsen eds., 2003)).  
 196 See supra Part II.B (discussing the U.S. fashion industry).  
 197 Similarly, unpredictability may result if courts choose to interpret the 
statute based on the type of items that are clearly already protected, the approach 
taken by Judge Posner in Friedrich. See supra Part IV.C.3. To what levels of 
abstraction would courts interpret the meaning of the items already protected in order 
to find that a particular item is also protected? This would depend on the discretionary 
judgment of the courts and therefore would be difficult for litigants to determine in 
advance. 
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lead to unpredictable judicial outcomes (the intentionalist 
approach). Formalism may be the most predictable approach, 
since litigants would be assured that those items that are 
explicitly listed in the Bill would be protected, but this 
approach does not account for items such as umbrellas and 
luggage that would seem to be fashion and thus deserving of 
protection.198 Intentionalism would more likely protect those 
items, since their creators could testify that they intended to 
create “fashion,” but this approach is so broad that virtually 
anything could be protected, even mass-produced items with 
low design content.199 Institutionalism would avoid this over-
breadth since it requires confirmation of the items’ status as 
fashion from fashion “experts” and institutions, but the 
approach may fail to protect emerging artists—one of the 
central purposes of the Bill—and would lead to unpredictable 
outcomes for litigants.200 Thus, the Bill has been drafted in a 
way that risks undermining the purpose of the proposed 
legislation by providing protection for those who do not need it, 
while denying protection to those most vulnerable to piracy, 
such as emerging designers. 
VI. LIKELY RESULT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  The Interpretive Approach Employed Will Depend on 
the Case 
Given that no one interpretive method will consistently 
lead to results that further the DPPA’s purpose,201 courts will 
likely apply whatever approach (or approaches) they feel to be 
most appropriate in any given case. Yen recognized this in the 
context of cases involving art, observing that the “overlapping 
pattern of strengths and weaknesses” of each aesthetic 
approach “practically guarantees that none of these theories 
will emerge as the comprehensive, authoritative definition of 
art.”202 Indeed, in most cases involving a statute governing 
“art,” courts have invoked varying, sometimes multiple 
approaches, emphasizing one perspective over another 
  
 198 See supra Part V.A. 
 199 See supra Part V.B. 
 200 See supra Part V.C. 
 201 See supra Part V.D. 
 202 Yen, supra note 102, at 260. 
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depending on the facts of the case and the purpose of the 
statute being invoked.203 
For example, in Botello v. Shell Oil Co., the court 
predominantly used formalist reasoning in holding that a 
mural was a “painting” under the California Art Preservation 
Act,204 while in Pollara v. Seymour, the court emphasized the 
intentions of the work’s creator in holding that a banner was 
not a “work of visual art” under VARA because it was an 
advertisement, and advertisements are explicitly excepted from 
VARA protection.205 The intentionalist approach was more 
appropriate in Pollara than in Botello since there the decision 
turned on the purpose of the work (whether it was meant as an 
advertisement). Conversely, in Botello, the artist’s intent to 
create a mural did not answer the question of whether a 
“mural” fell within the definition of “painting” and thus a 
formalist approach was more appropriate. The Phillips court 
invoked all three interpretive approaches in determining 
whether a public sculpture park was a “work of visual art” 
under VARA, although the analysis focused on the formalist 
approach.206 In addition to invoking dictionary definitions of 
“sculpture” to determine that the park did not qualify for the 
statute’s protection (a formalist approach),207 the court also took 
an intentionalist perspective, noting the artist’s intent 
regarding the identity of his sculptures,208 as well as an 
institutionalist perspective, citing art experts’ opinions on 
whether the park was sculpture.”209 However, the court 
emphasized the legislative intent that VARA be construed 
narrowly in ultimately focusing the bulk of its analysis on 
formalist reasoning.210 
In the case of the DPPA, courts may similarly employ 
the approach(es) most appropriate to a particular case, given 
the case’s facts and the purpose of the legislation. For example, 
  
 203 Yen notes that in copyright cases courts employ the analytical perspective 
based on how “subjective and aesthetically controversial” it is compared to the other 
approaches, given the facts of a particular case. Id. at 298. 
 204 Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 205 Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 265-66, 270 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 206 See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D. 
Mass. 2003). 
 207 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 208 “[He] believes that his sculptures . . . are works of visual art . . . and are 
meaningful only if they remain in [the park].” Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 94. 
 209 “[The artist’s expert] concedes that a park does not meet the traditional 
definition of sculpture.” Id. at 99. 
 210 Id. 
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courts may decline to use an institutionalist approach when the 
case involves a work by a young designer who has not yet been 
recognized within the fashion community. Instead they could 
adopt a formalist or intentionalist perspective in determining 
whether the work qualifies for protection to avoid undermining 
the Bill’s goal of protecting emerging designers. By contrast, 
courts may emphasize institutionalist or intentionalist 
rationales in cases involving items not explicitly listed under 
the Bill’s definition of “fashion design,” such as umbrellas and 
garments designed for pets. Moreover, just as the Phillips court 
cited the legislative intent that VARA be interpreted narrowly 
to justify its formalist reasoning, courts are likely to look to the 
congressional intent behind the DPPA, as yet to be articulated 
and debated through the legislative process, to determine 
which approach best furthers the purpose of the statute.211 
B.  Recommendations 
Given the variety of approaches courts might take to 
interpreting the Bill, Congress should address its scope as well 
as the way it should be interpreted in order to promote 
predictability for litigants and to reduce the likelihood that 
courts will undermine its purpose. Congress should debate 
these issues and revise the proposed statutory language to 
provide guidance to the courts. 
First, Congress should be explicit about the purpose of 
the legislation and whether it is meant to be interpreted 
broadly or narrowly, perhaps in an expanded preamble.212 
Courts have frequently considered congressional intent in 
determining how to construe VARA, citing the House Reports 
as evidence that Congress intended the statute to be 
interpreted narrowly and noting that congressional debate 
indicated that the statute’s scope was to be “limited to certain 
carefully defined types of works and artists.”213 In the case of 
the DPPA, Congress should similarly address whether the 
  
 211 The current legislative intent of the DPPA is to protect fashion designers, 
especially emerging designers from the top tier of the fashion pyramid, and to promote 
the United States’ fashion industry. See supra Part II.C. This Note presumes that this 
will remain the purpose of the proposed legislation if it is enacted.  
 212 Instead of just “to provide protection for fashion design,” as the Bill 
currently reads, see supra text accompanying note 77, the preamble could say 
something that would more specifically reflect the Congressional intent behind the Bill, 
such as: “to provide protection for fashion design to protect the United States’ fashion 
industry and its high-end designers.”  
 213 See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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legislation should be interpreted narrowly or broadly, and 
whether it is meant to be limited to “certain carefully defined 
types of works and [fashion designers],” such as designers of 
top-tier fashion and emerging designers. Indeed, Congress 
should explicitly state how the law is to be interpreted in the 
statutory text, thereby illuminating its position even more 
clearly than in the case of VARA, so that courts do not have to 
divine intent from debate records. This would help courts 
decide whether to view a particular case through a formalist, 
institutionalist, or intentionalist lens. It would also promote 
predictability as courts could decide cases in ways that 
consistently reflect the articulated legislative goal.  
Second, the proposed legislation should be amended to 
leave more flexibility in the statutory language defining 
“apparel” in order to reduce the harshness of the formalist 
approach and prevent inequitable results,214 especially if 
Congress indicates that the Bill should be interpreted 
narrowly. For example, a “miscellaneous” category could be 
added under the definition of “apparel.” After stating  
“apparel means . . . an article of men’s, women’s, or children’s 
clothing, . . . handbags, purses, and tote bags; belts; and 
eyeglass frames,”215 the phrase, “and all similar items” could be 
added to the end of the list. Or the definition could be amended 
to read “the term ‘apparel’ includes, but is not limited to . . . .” 
This construction would allow courts to interpret the statutory 
language literally while preventing the strict exclusion of items 
not explicitly listed but which should sometimes be protected, 
such as luggage and briefcases.216 It would also invite courts to 
interpret the term “fashion design” as including apparel that 
falls within the same type as the items listed under the 
definition of the term “apparel.”217 Although allowing courts 
more discretion may lead to greater unpredictability for 
litigants, the potential uncertainty would be reduced if 
Congress clearly articulates its goals for the legislation and as 
case law interpreting the legislation develops. Congress could 
also reduce the likelihood of inequitable outcomes resulting 
from formalist interpretations of the legislation by expressly 
  
 214 See supra Part V.A. (discussing the potential problems with the formalist 
approach). 
 215  See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (describing the structure of the 
VHDPA). 
 216 See supra Part V.A. 
 217 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
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excluding certain items from the Bill’s protection, such as 
mass-produced apparel.218 This would codify the congressional 
intent and thereby lower the risk that items such as sporting 
apparel and protective clothing would unwittingly be granted 
protection under the Bill.219 
Third, Congress should provide guidance as to what 
sources courts should consult to interpret its terms, such as the 
designers themselves or experts from the industry especially if 
Congress indicates that the Bill should be interpreted broadly. 
For example, regarding VARA, Congress specified, “[C]ourts 
should use common sense and generally accepted standards of 
the artistic community in determining whether a particular 
work falls within the scope of the definition.”220 Congress could 
similarly specify whether courts should use “common sense,” 
“generally accepted standards of the [fashion] community,” or 
the designer’s intentions to determine whether a particular 
item falls within the scope of the DPPA.221 These types of 
specifications would lead to more predictable outcomes for 
litigants, who could then foresee in advance which interpretive 
approach(es) the courts would be most likely to rely on. 
  
 218 For example, VARA is limited by the definition of “visual art” in Title 17, 
which explicitly provides that a “work of visual art does not include . . . any 
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging 
material or container.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The Pollara court cited this definition in 
finding that the banner at issue was not protected by VARA. 344 F.3d at 265-66. 
Moreover, VARA also specifically excludes mass-produced objects, providing that in 
order to receive protection, the item must exist in no more than 200 copies. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2000). Congress could provide a similar limitation on the protection granted to 
fashion items under the DPPA.  
 219 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. A more drastic option to 
eliminate some of the problems associated with a narrow interpretation of the 
legislation would be for Congress to cut out the definition of “apparel” altogether and 
let courts decide, based on their own understanding of the term, what constitutes 
“apparel.” One commentator recently proposed an amendment to Title 17 that would 
provide protection for apparel designs. In her mock amendment, which would serve 
“[t]o strengthen the intellectual property laws of the United States by providing 
apparel protection of original apparel designs,” the author proposed that “[t]he design 
of a garment” be subject to protection, but unlike the DPPA, the amendment does not 
define “garment” or “apparel.” Nurbhai, supra note 18, at 525-37. However, Congress 
may wish to give courts and litigants an idea of the types of items that certainly are 
covered, just as many legislatures define “art” by providing a list of what is included 
within this broad term. See supra note 119.  
 220 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 514, at 11 (1990)). 
 221 Id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This Note explores the question of what is “fashion 
design” under the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. Because the 
answer is not as clear as it may initially seem, Congress should 
give greater guidance to courts as to the Bill’s scope of 
protection if it is enacted into law. As written, the Bill risks 
being both over-inclusive by providing protection for items that 
were likely not meant to be protected, and under-inclusive by 
failing to provide protection for items that fall within what 
seems to be the primary purpose of the Bill. Just as courts 
judging art take a variety of approaches to interpreting the 
meaning of “art,” courts interpreting the meaning of “fashion 
design” under the Bill could employ various interpretive 
perspectives, each potentially resulting in different, possibly 
problematic, outcomes. Both to avoid the risk of over-
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness and also to promote 
greater predictability for litigants, Congress should give 
greater guidance to the courts as to how the legislation is to be 
interpreted. 
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